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Some Lessons Learned About Leadership in Operation Desert Shield/Storm

**Joel M. Savell, Trueman R. Tremble, Jr.,
and Ross C. Teague**
U.S. Army Research Institute

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study sought to identify lessons learned about leadership in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) that the Army could use to assess/update its leader development programs. Two questions were addressed: (1) In a situation like ODS/S, are any of the Army's nine leadership competencies (FM 22-100) considered more important than the others?, and (2) Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way, or do changes need to be made? To gather data, a questionnaire was administered to 357 ODS/S veterans (mostly Captains) attending leader development courses at the Army's Command and General Staff College. With respect to the first question, researchers concluded that these Officers viewed the competencies of decision-making, technical/tactical skills, and professional ethics to be among the most important for their own leadership in ODS/S and the competencies of teaching/counseling, use of available systems, and supervision among the least important. With respect to the second question, researchers concluded that these Officers (a) had a high opinion of the leadership they had received from their ODS/S commanders and (b) evaluated the Army's leader development program positively.				
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in Operation Desert Shield/Storm**

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FOREWORD

This report presents the results of a study to identify some lessons learned about leadership in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) that the Army could use to assess/update its leader development program. The study focused on two questions: (1) In a situation like ODS/S, are any of the Army's nine leadership competencies (FM 22-100) considered more important than the others and, if so, which ones are they? and (2) Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way, or do changes need to be made?

This effort was part of the "Decision Aids for Leadership Practices" task conducted by the Leadership and Motivation Technical Area (LMTA), now incorporated into the Leadership and Organizational Change Technical Area (LOCTA) of the Manpower and Personnel Research Division. The effort was supported by a Memorandum for Record ("Studies Requested by the Center for Army Leadership, Command and General Staff College"--"Leadership Requirements Identified in Desert Shield/Storm"), signed by Colonel Michael D. Shaler (7 Nov 91) and Brigadier General William M. Steele (18 Nov 91). The results of this effort were briefed to the Center for Army Leadership in September 1992.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

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This report presents the results of a study to identify some lessons learned about leadership in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) that the Army could use to assess/update its leader development program. The study focused on two questions: (1) In a situation like ODS/S, are any of the Army's nine leadership competencies (FM 22-100) considered more important than the others and, if so, which ones are they? and (2) Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way, or do changes need to be made?

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SOME LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LEADERSHIP IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) provided an opportunity to obtain valuable insights about leadership in a combat situation. This study sought to capture some of these insights for the Center for Army Leadership (CAL). Two questions were addressed:

- (1) In a situation like ODS/S, are any of the Army's nine leadership competencies (FM 22-100) considered more important than the others?
- (2) Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way, or are there changes that need to be made?

Procedure:

CAL distributed a questionnaire to students in the 1991-92 Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) and in two Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) classes. In one section of the questionnaire, each of the nine leadership competencies was paired with each of the other eight. Respondents were asked to say, for each comparison, which of the two competencies they considered more important for their leadership in ODS/S. In another section of the questionnaire, respondents were asked their opinions about objectives and methods of the Army's leader development program (as well as leadership doctrine generally) and were invited to say what changes (if any) they thought should be made. In a third section of the questionnaire, respondents evaluated the leadership of their commander in ODS/S.

Findings:

Respondents showed considerable agreement as to the relative importance of the competencies for their own leadership in ODS/S. Mean importance scores tended, however, to fall into several groups or levels. Competencies at the top level were professional ethics, decision-making, and technical/tactical skills,

while competencies at the fourth (bottom) level were supervision, teaching/counseling, and use of available systems.

Large majorities endorsed statements saying the most important things are being given the emphasis they deserve, the Army is using the most effective methods for training the nine leadership competencies, and the present leadership doctrine is good and correct as it stands now. But there were nontrivial minorities (ranging from 6 to 25%) who said NO, and it is not clear how these NOs should be interpreted.

Judging by the responses provided by the Officers in this sample (mostly Captains), ODS/S commanders (presumed to be mostly Lieutenant Colonels) provided a high level of leadership for their subordinate officers. Also, respondents who said they were clear about their commander's intent (and/or the mission objectives that gave expression to this intent) rated their commander high on motivation, confidence, and overall leadership.

Utilization of Findings:

The Center for Army Leadership will use the results of this study to assess and (as needed) update its leader development program.

SOME LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LEADERSHIP IN OPERATION DESERT
SHIELD/STORM

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SOME LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LEADERSHIP IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Introduction

Background

The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) is an Army proponent for leadership doctrine and training; over the years it has sought to identify factors (particularly in the human dimension) that contribute to effective leadership. Against this background CAL asked the Army Research Institute (ARI) to identify potentially useful lessons on leadership learned in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S). CAL anticipated that a large number of ODS/S veterans would be attending courses on leader development at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) during the 1991-92 school year and believed these officer-veterans would be able to provide valuable insights about leadership based on their actual and recent experiences in a combat situation. CAL was seeking to determine whether current leadership doctrine and training needed to be updated, and CAL representatives identified several kinds of information they believed would be useful in making this determination.

Objective

The study sought to identify some lessons about leadership in ODS/S that CAL would be able to use in assessing/updating its leader development programs. In pursuing this objective we sought to do the following: First, we sought to provide information on two questions that were of particular interest to CAL:

1. In a combat situation, are any of the nine leadership competencies in FM 22-100 considered more important than the others?
2. Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way, or are there changes that need to be made?

Second, we sought to obtain a set of descriptions of behavior (behavioral incidents) observed in ODS/S that CAL would be able to use, more-or-less in the form provided, as part of its leadership training materials.

Method

We designed a questionnaire that, along with a follow-up

interview guide,¹ addressed each of the above questions. The instrument was pretested, revised, and sent to CAL for distribution to ODS/S veterans enrolled in the two CGSC courses. One was the 1992 Command and General Staff Officer course (CGSOC), whose students were mostly majors and lieutenant colonels; the other was a course at the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³), whose students were mostly captains. Questionnaires were put into the targeted students' mailboxes, along with a brief note from CAL explaining the survey and asking recipients to return their completed questionnaire (via inter-office mail) to the CAL representative. In addition, the note (supplemented in some groups by an announcement) reminded recipients that their participation was entirely voluntary. A total of 357 questionnaires were completed and returned² (all but 10 of them from CAS³), and CAL sent these completed questionnaires back to ARI for analysis.³

Characteristics of those returning the questionnaire are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the sample consisted mainly of company-grade officers (mostly captains), though it included a few who were field-grade (mostly majors). With respect to gender, 7% identified themselves as female, 91% identified themselves as male, and 2% failed to respond to the question. Female officers thus constituted somewhere between 7% and 9% of the sample. By way of summary, the sample consisted mainly of active duty male captains from combat, combat support, and combat

¹ The interview guide was intended for use in follow-up interviews with respondents one or more of whose questionnaire responses needed elaboration or clarification. Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to conduct these interviews.

² Data were not provided to us on the number of veterans who were enrolled in these classes and who received a copy of the questionnaire. In the case of CAS³, our impression is that most of the veterans who received the questionnaire returned it; in the case of CGSOC, our impression is that most of the veterans who received the questionnaire did not return it.

³ We have no information on the extent of differences, if any, between veterans who did and did not return the questionnaire. Also, it is not clear whether or in what way questionnaires received from the CAS³ students (mostly captains) differed from the questionnaires received from CGSOC students (mostly majors). Visual inspection of questionnaire responses from these two groups showed no large or clear-cut differences between them, but the number of CGSOC students in the sample was too small to compare the two groups statistically. This fact, plus the already-small size of the CAS³ sample, led us to combine the two groups (CAS³ and CGSOC students) into a single sample for the analyses reported here.

Table 1
Demographics of the Sample (N=357)

<u>Gender</u>	<u>$\frac{2}{3}$</u>
MALE	91
FEMALE	7
No Response.	2
<u>Rank</u>	<u>$\frac{2}{3}$</u>
1LT.	3
CPT.	87
MAJ.	9
LTC.	1
N/R.	*
<u>Component</u>	<u>$\frac{2}{3}$</u>
Active	98
National Guard	*
Reserve.	1
N/R.	1
<u>ODS/S Unit Category</u>	<u>$\frac{2}{3}$</u>
COMBAT	45
COMBAT SUPPORT	23
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	31
OTHER/NR.	1
<u>Type of Position in ODS/S</u>	<u>$\frac{2}{3}$</u>
COMMAND.	51
STAFF.	47
OTHER/NR	2

service support units, with about half the respondents having served in command positions.

Results

(Judged) Relative Importance of the Nine Competencies

The first question for the study focused on the nine competencies that FM 22-100 recommends for use in leader assessment and development:

- Communication
- Decision-making
- Planning
- Professional ethics
- Soldier-team development
- Supervision
- Teaching/counseling
- Technical/tactical skill
- Use of available systems

(see Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990).

The purpose of the question was to find out whether these officers, based on their experiences in ODS/S, considered any competencies more important than others and, if so, which ones they were.

The section of the questionnaire that addressed the nine competencies listed each of the 36 possible pairings of these competencies (e.g., communication vs supervision, communication vs planning, decision-making vs supervision); and, for each pairing, participants were asked to indicate which of the two competencies was more important for them in ODS/S. Each of the nine competencies was then scored for the number of times it was chosen over the other eight with which it was compared, and a mean "relative importance" score was computed for each competency. The score for a given competency could thus range from a high of 8.0 (if every respondent always chose that competency over each of the other eight with which it was compared) to a low of 0.0 (if that competency was never chosen over any of the other eight with which it was compared). The actual range was from a high of 6.33 to a low of 3.26. Computing these means enabled us to do three things: Assign a "relative importance" score to each of the competencies, rank these competencies according to the magnitude of their scores, and then statistically examine the differences between the scores to see whether the scores appeared to fall into groups or levels.

Overall rankings and groupings. Respondents showed considerable agreement as to the relative importance of the

competencies. The rank order of the means (examined with Kendall's Coefficient of concordance) was highly reliable statistically.⁴ And an analysis of differences between these means (using the Scheffe Test) showed that they fell into four statistically different levels or groupings. Competencies at the top level were professional ethics, decision-making, and technical/tactical skills; at the second level was planning; at the third level were soldier-team development and communication; and at the fourth (bottom) level were teaching/counseling, use of available systems, and supervision. Table 2, Section A (means for the total sample), shows the nine competencies ranked according to their mean importance and the four groupings into which these means fell.

Combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The observed rank order of the scores was generally similar for subgroups of respondents whose ODS/S unit had been combat ($n=150$), combat support ($n=79$), and combat service support ($n=107$). One of the competencies, decision-making, was at the top level for respondents from all three types of unit; and three of the competencies, teaching/counseling, use of available systems, and supervision, were at the bottom level in all three types of unit. There were, however, some differences. For example, planning was at the top level for respondents from combat support units; but it was at the second level for respondents from combat units and at the third level for respondents from combat service support units. Professional ethics was at the top level for respondents from combat and combat service support units, but it was in the second level for those from combat support units. Table 2, Section B (means for the three type-of-unit subsamples), shows the competencies ranked according to their mean importance in each of these subsamples and the groupings in to which these means fell.⁵

Command vs staff positions. The observed rank order of scores was generally similar for subgroups of respondents who during ODS/S had been in a command position ($n=176$) and for respondents who had been in a staff position ($n=157$). One of the competencies, technical/tactical skills, was at the top level in

⁴ Here and elsewhere in this report we have reported as statistically reliable only those differences (or other statistics) where the probability of their being due to chance alone is less than one in a thousand. With respect Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, a significant value is usually interpreted as meaning that the observers, in giving their judgments, were applying essentially the same standard.

⁵Not every respondent answered every questions or provided all the requested identifying information. As a result, n s do not always sum to 357.

Table 2
Rank Order of Leadership Competencies, Statistically Grouped for the Total Sample and for Selected Subsamples

(A) TOTAL SAMPLE (N = 357)	(B) TYPE OF ODS/S UNIT		(C) TYPE OF ODS/S POSITION	
	COMBAT (n = 150)	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (n = 79)	COMBAT (n = 176)	STAFF (n = 157)
1. Professional ethics	1. Technical/Tactical skills	1. Planning	1. Decision-making	1. Professional ethics
2. Decision-making	2. Decision-making	2. Decision-making	2. Professional ethics	2. Technical/ Tactical skills
3. Technical/Tactical skills	3. Professional ethics	3. Technical/Tactical skills	3. Technical/Tactical skills	3. Technical/Tactical skills
4. Planning	4. Planning	4. Professional ethics	4. Soldier-team development	4. Decision-making
5. Soldier-team development	5. Soldier-team development	5. Soldier-team development	5. Planning	5. Communication
6. Communication	6. Communication	6. Communication	6. Communication	6. Soldier-team development
7. Teaching/counseling	7. Teaching/counseling	7. Teaching/counseling	7. Teaching/counseling	7. Use of available systems
8. Use of available systems	8. Use of available systems	8. Use of available systems	8. Supervision	8. Teaching/ counseling
9. Supervision	9. Supervision	9. Supervision	9. Use of available systems	9. Supervision

in each type of position; and teaching/counseling, use of available systems, and supervision, were again at the bottom level. As before, however, there were some differences. For example, decision-making was at the top level for respondents who had been command positions; but it was at the second level for those who had been in staff positions. And while soldier-team development was at the second level for respondents who had been in command positions, it was at the fourth level for those who were in combat support units. Table 2, Section C (means for the two type-of-position subsamples), shows the competencies ranked according to their mean importance in each of these subsamples and the groupings in to which these means fell.

Judgments About the Army's Leader Development Program

The second question for the study ("Is the Army's leader development program teaching the right things, in the right way?") was addressed in two ways. The first was by asking respondents direct, evaluative questions about the program. They were reminded of the program's three components--guided self development, institutional ("school house") training, and unit/organizational practices aimed at leader development. They were then presented with a series of questions seeking to determine whether, based on their experience in ODS/S, these officer-veterans thought the Army's method of training/developing leaders was adequate as it was or whether it needed to be changed in some way. The questions asked and the distribution of responses to these questions are shown in Table 3. As can be seen, most responses were favorable (more than three quarters of the responses to the three questions were YES), although the number of NOs was not trivial.⁶ Respondents who answered NO to any of these questions were invited to write-in whatever comments they wished to make. A fair number of respondents provided such comments; but, for the most part, comments from these respondents were difficult to interpret. They varied widely in substance, length, and form; and they did not provide a sure basis for inferences either about specific program strengths/weaknesses or about changes that might improve the program.

Evaluation of Leadership in ODS/S

The other way in which we addressed the question about the Army's leader development program was more indirect. We assumed that the quality of leadership exhibited by unit commanders in ODS/S would, at least in some degree, reflect the quality of the

⁶The "OTHER/NR" responses were those for which the respondent either did not answer the question or wrote in comments (see below) that failed to address it.

Table 3

How Respondents Answered the Three Questions About the Army's
Leader Development Programs

1. Are the things the Army teaches in these programs the right things? Are the most important things being given the emphasis they deserve?

<u>Response</u>	<u>%</u>
YES	71
NO	25
OTHER/NR	4

2. Is the Army using the most effective methods for training leaders in the nine leadership competencies?

<u>Response</u>	<u>%</u>
YES	78
NO	15
OTHER/NR	7

3. Is the doctrine in the leadership manuals (FM 22-100 and FM 22-103) good and correct as it stands now?

<u>Response</u>	<u>%</u>
YES	84
NO	6
OTHER/NR	10

leadership training they had received. We thus asked participants to think back over their experiences in ODS/S and to evaluate the leadership they had received from their ODS/S unit commander. Two kinds of measures were used.

Explicit measures of leadership. One set of questions asked respondents about their ODS/S commander's motivation, confidence, and overall leadership. Since these questions focused directly on attributes of the commander, they were viewed as explicit measures of the commander's leadership. The three questions, along with the scale used with each, are shown in Table 4, Section A.

Implicit measures of leadership. Another set of questions asked respondents how clear to them their unit mission objectives had been in ODS/S and, separately, how clear to them had been their "commander's intent (purpose)" with respect to these objectives. The questions thus asked respondents for self-reports about psychological states presumed to result in large measure from what their commanders had said and how (or how clearly) they had said it. In other words, we assumed that the way respondents answered these questions implied something about how well their commanders had performed an important aspect of their job; and we treated the questions as implicit measures of commander leadership. The two questions, along with the scale used with each, are shown in Table 4, Section B.

We expected the explicit measures to be related to the implicit measures, and to test this expectation we computed a standard product moment correlation between them. The coefficient of this correlation ($r=.59$) proved to be highly reliable statistically, suggesting that the way respondents evaluated their ODS/S commanders was related to how clearly these commanders had articulated the objective of the unit's mission and the reason the mission needed to be carried out.

Overall, respondents' rating of their ODS/S commander's leadership (combining scores on the five items) was high. On the 10-point scale, the overall mean rating was 8.2. There were differences, however, in how these commanders were rated by male and female respondents. Males gave their ODS/S commander a mean rating of 8.3, while females gave theirs a mean rating of 7.2. While the female subsample was fairly small ($n=25$), difference between means of these two subsamples was highly reliable statistically. Differences in leadership ratings for other respondent groupings (e.g., respondents who had been in command positions compared with respondents who had been in staff positions) were small and/or statistically unreliable.

Table 4

Questionnaire Items Concerning the Leadership Exhibited by
Respondent's Unit Commander in ODS/S

A. Explicit Measures

1. (In ODS/S) How would you rate your commander's usual level of motivation?

EXTREMELY										EXTREMELY
LOW										HIGH
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

2. (In ODS/S) How would you rate your commander's usual level of confidence?

EXTREMELY										EXTREMELY
LOW										HIGH
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

3. (In ODS/S) How would you rate the overall quality of your commander's leadership?

EXTREMELY										EXTREMELY
LOW										HIGH
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

B. Implicit Measures

4. (In ODS/S) How clear to YOU (usually) were the mission objectives for your unit?

NOT CLEAR										COMPLETELY
AT ALL										CLEAR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

5. (In ODS/S) How clear to YOU (usually) was the "commander's intent" (purpose)?

NOT CLEAR										COMPLETELY
AT ALL										CLEAR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

Descriptions of Leadership Observed in ODS/S

Participants were asked to write descriptions of outstanding leadership they had witnessed in ODS, and instructions were provided for their use in writing these descriptions. As indicated above, our objective was to obtain the kind of descriptive information that CAL could incorporate, more-or-less directly, into relevant leader development materials. Ninety-six of the 357 respondents provided one or more leadership descriptions (total number of descriptions=99); and we provided these descriptions to CAL.

Discussion

The Nine Leader Competencies

Relative importance in the total sample. The officers in this study (mainly company-grade) showed considerable agreement as to the relative importance of these competencies for their own leadership in ODS/S. The mean importance scores tended, however, to fall into several groups or levels. Competencies at the top level were professional ethics, decision-making, and technical/tactical skills, while competencies at the fourth (bottom) level were supervision, teaching/counseling, and use of available systems. In between, at levels two and three, were planning, soldier-team development, and communication.

Relative importance in various subgroups. The observed rank order of scores was generally similar for subsamples from combat, combat support, and combat service support; and they were generally similar also for the subsamples from command and staff positions. Although there was no single competency that appeared at the top level all five of these (overlapping) subsamples, 3 of these competencies (professional ethics, technical /tactical skills, and decision-making) were at the top level in four of them.

Comparison with findings from other studies. How do these findings compare with findings from other studies? Comparisons are difficult due to the fact that the present study differs in important ways from those others with which we are familiar: the particular set of competencies on which respondents' choices were based, the way in which the questions were asked, the make-up of the sample, the sample size, and the situation (actual combat vs simulated combat) on which respondents judgments were based.

In one study (Julien and Siebold, 1990), eight commanders (company, battalion, and brigade) were shown a list of ten leadership competencies (the present nine plus one more) and asked to say which three of these competencies were most

important for a company commander at NTC.⁷ Of the ten competencies presented, two (decision-making and planning) were chosen by more than half the commanders--a result that is partly similar and partly dissimilar to the result found in the present study. In the present study, one of these competencies (decision-making) was at the top level for the most relevant subsample (respondents who had been in a command position); but the other competency (planning) was at the second level. In a second study (Kessling, Ford, O'Mara, McFann, & Holz, 1992), company commanders who had recently returned from NTC were shown a list of 13 competencies (8 of the present 9 plus 5 others) and asked to say which four were most important for someone in their position at NTC. Competencies mentioned most often by the 52 respondents included technical/tactical, planning, and decision-making. Two of these competencies (technical-tactical and decision-making) were at the top level in the present study, but (again) planning was not. Competencies mentioned least often included teaching/counseling and supervision. As indicated earlier, both of these were at bottom level in the present study.

Thus, with respect to perceptions of the relative importance of the various leadership competencies for leaders at the respondent's own level (in most cases, captains) the results of the present effort were in some ways similar to those reported in other studies and in some ways different. Of particular interest is the fact that while the present study found professional ethics consistently at the top level (for the total sample as well as in most of the subgroups), it was hardly ever chosen in either of the other two studies. Why the discrepancy? It is tempting to conclude that judgments of relative importance based on experiences in an actual combat situation (which is what the present study is assumed to have obtained) are simply different (in ways not yet known) from judgments based on experiences in a situation that only simulates combat. There are, however, other possibilities. One is that the differing results reflect differences in the way the relevant questions were asked. In the present study, the question format required respondents to judge explicitly the importance of each competency, compared with that of each other competency. In the other studies, the question wording (some variant of "Select the top three") allowed respondents to avoid thinking about a particular competency if they wished to and to make their selection from the other competencies. Another possibility derives from the fact that the survey was administered near the end of the students' courses. It is possible that the attention given to professional ethics in these courses functioned to heighten its salience and, in so doing, increase the likelihood that students would judge it

⁷They also asked the leaders to select three competencies for a platoon leader.

important when comparing it with other characteristics.⁸ Yet another possibility is that, in the studies cited, the sample size was too small for reliable comparisons with the present study. Without additional data, however, we cannot say for sure which of these explanations (or what other one) is correct.

The Army's Leader Development Program

Direct, evaluative questions about the program. With respect to the Army's leader development program, respondents appeared generally to approve. Large majorities endorsed statements saying that the most important things are given the emphasis they deserve, that the Army is using the most effective methods for training the nine leadership competencies, and that present leadership doctrine is good and correct as it stands now. But there were nontrivial minorities (ranging from 6 to 25%) who said No, and it is not clear just how these NOs should be interpreted.

Evaluations of own commanders' leadership in ODS/S. Judging by the responses provided by the officers in this sample, ODS/S commanders provided a high level of leadership for their subordinate officers. Since the sample consisted mostly (87%) of captains, we assume the commanders described by these officers were mostly lieutenant colonels. On a scale from 1 to 10, the officers gave their commanders a mean rating of 8.2. Female officers rated their commander lower than male officers did; and while the difference was not large it was highly reliable statistically. Also, respondents who said they were clear about their commander's intent (and/or the unit mission objectives that gave expression to this intent) rated their commander high on motivation, confidence, and overall leadership. These relationships support the generally accepted view that communicating mission objectives and commander's intent is an important part of leadership.

The Sample

As indicated earlier, the sample obtained for this study was unusual (and limited) in at least two respects. First, although CAL had expected its procedures to bring in a significant number of officers at both company and battalion levels, as it turned out, those who returned the questionnaire came almost entirely from CAS³ and were primarily company-grade officers (most of them captains). In other words, respondent judgments in this study concerning the relative importance of the nine leadership competencies, the adequacy of the Army's leader development program, and the quality of the commander's leadership in ODS/S

⁸This possibility was suggested to us by Clinton Walker.

should be viewed primarily as reflecting the judgments of captains (though in the latter case it was presumably lieutenant colonels--i.e., the respondents' battalion commanders--who were being judged).

Second, the sample consisted of individuals who essentially had volunteered for the study; and we do not know for sure just how many "nonvolunteers" there were. As indicated earlier, however, our impression is that--with respect to the classes that provided most of the sample (i.e., the CAS³ classes)--the majority of officers who were eligible to participate did so. If this is the case, the company level officers in this sample would be a reasonable representation of the kinds of officers who attend that course.

Conclusions

1. The officer-veterans in the present sample (mostly company grade and mainly captains) considered decision-making, technical/tactical skills, and professional ethnics to be among the most important for their leadership in ODS/S.
2. These officers considered teaching/counseling, use of a available systems, and supervision to be relatively less important for their leadership in ODS/S.
3. Overall, evaluations of the Army's leader development program were clearly positive.
4. These officers had a generally high opinion of the leadership they received from their ODS/S commanders. They rated their commanders high on such things as motivation, confidence, and overall leadership; and they said they had been clear with respect both to the mission objectives of their unit and the commander's intent with respect to these objectives. Further, those who rated their commander high on motivation, confidence, and overall leadership rated themselves high with respect to their understanding of their unit's mission objectives and their commander's intent with respect to these objectives.

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